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Fiscal rules have been the centre of economic debate in European Union Member 
States. They indicate the direction in which policymakers aim to evolve public 
finances. In recent years the public finances of European Union Member States have 
been affected by two major changes in economic and institutional settings. These 
are the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union and progressive fiscal 
decentralisation in a significant number of European Union Member States. In order 
to support the fiscal decentralisation process European Union Member States need 
to have appropriate fiscal policy rules. They can stimulate policy coordination 
between different levels of government depending on their institutional coverage. 
The aim of this paper is to present an analysis of the fiscal rule index and fiscal rule 
strength index in European Union Member States, with special emphasis on Croatia. 
The Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs methodology was used 
in analysing the fiscal rule index and fiscal rule strength index by type and 
government sectors in the period from 2003-2013 in European Union Member States. 
Based on our results, the fiscal rule index for Croatia, from the period 2003-2013, is 
continually on the rise from -1.01 in 2008 to a high 1.43 in 2013.  
 
Keywords: public finances, fiscal policy, fiscal rule index, fiscal rule strength index, EU 
area 
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Introduction  
EU Member States, including Croatia (since 01 July 2013), have a strong interest in 
fiscal policy rules, with the aim of reducing public sector deficits and public sector 
debts. According to Hallerberg et al. (2007) "interest in fiscal rules is a reaction to the 
experience in many countries of rapidly rising debt levels and unsustainable deficits 
in the 1970s and 1980s." (p. 339) After the 2007/2008 financial crisis, some regulations 
have been amended in the EU to strengthen EU's fiscal governance and to maintain 
sustainability of public finances. After these regulations, EU Member States 
introduced fiscal rules, independent fiscal councils and more stringent medium-term 
budgeting frameworks. The objectives of these fiscal rules are to curb the deficit bias 
of governments, lead to balanced public finances and to assure the financial 
markets about the medium term fiscal goals. According to Marneffe et al. (2010) 
"fiscal rules, whether quantitative or not, indicate the direction in which policymakers 
aim the public finances to evolve and the public sector's role in macroeconomic 
processes. It also provides a solution to the deficit bias problem that is caused by the 
governments' short-sightedness and the common pool problem." (p. 2) 
 Fiscal policy rules control targets for annual government deficits, debts or 










national fiscal frameworks within the EU and suggests that "stronger" fiscal rules are 
conductive to sound public finances (and ultimately more efficient and growth-
enhancing economic policies). According to European Commission (2010) "domestic 
fiscal frameworks are defined as the set of elements that form national fiscal 
governance, i.e. the overall system of arrangements, procedures and institutions that 
underlines the planning and implementation of budgetary policies (p. 73). 
 Kopits and Symanski (1998) state that a fiscal rule is "a permanent constraint on 
fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator of fiscal performance, such 
as the government budget deficits, borrowing debt or a major component 
thereof."The design of the appropriate fiscal framework depends on country-specific 
circumstances (Von Hagen 2006, Hallerberg et. al. 2007, 2009, Ljungman, 2008). In 
literature, there are several studies that try to evaluate the effectiveness of EU fiscal 
rules and the impact of EU fiscal rules on economic growth (Arestis et al. 2001, Warin 
2005, Wyplosz 2006, Galli and Perotti 2003, Marinheiro 2004, Artis and Onorante 2006, 
Hein and Truger 2005, Savona and Viviani 2003, Soukiazis and Castro 2003, 2005). 
Sacchi and Salotti (2015) found that the aggressive use of discretionary fiscal policy, 
particularly of government consumption items, leads to higher volatility of output 
and, to a lesser extent, inflation. They find that the introduction of fiscal rules 
significantly affects the stabilisation function of fiscal policy. Castro (2011) provides 
evidence that, on average, growth is statistically higher in the period in which the 
fulfilment of the 3% criteria for the deficit started to be officially assessed. Reuter 
(2015) states that fiscal rules act as a kind of benchmark for policy makers, and the 
public, and even though they might be complied with only in half of the years, they 
still tilt fiscal policy towards numerical limits in times of non-compliance. 
 In this paper, the main aim is to present an analysis of the fiscal rule index (FRI) in 
the period from 2003-2013 and fiscal rule strength index (FRSI) in EU Member States, 
with special emphasis on Croatia in the period from 2008-2013. The goal of this paper 
is to stress the uncertainty and sensitivity of the fiscal rule index that arise from the 
fiscal rule coverage and criteria used in its construction. The value of the fiscal rule 
index has been critically reviewed, considering specific circumstances of the fiscal 
framework by countries and adopted fiscal rules. 
 
Methodology 
There are broad categories and types of numerical fiscal rules, i.e. budget balance, 
borrowing and debt rules, expenditure rules and revenue rules (European 
Commission 2006,p. 149). 
 According to the methodology applied in European Commission, Public Finances 
in the EMU – 2006 report, the measurement of the strength of fiscal rules is based on 
five criteria (p. 163): 
• Criterion 1: statutory base of the rule;  
• Criterion 2: nature of the body in charge of monitoring respect of the rule; 
• Criterion 3: nature of the body in charge of enforcement; 
• Criterion 4: enforcement mechanisms of the rule and 
• Criterion 5: media visibility  
 The methodology was based on a previous work by Deroose et. al. (2005). The 
fiscal rule strength index is calculated for each rule by aggregating the scores. "The 
scores of the five criteria were first standardised to run between 0 and 1. Then a 
random weights technique was used following the method used by Sutherland et al. 
(2005). This techniques uses 10 000 sets of randomly generated weights to calculate 
the synthetic indicator in 10 000 different ways. The random weights are drawn from 










measurement of strength of fiscal rules was combined with a measurement of the 
coverage by weighting the rule with the percentage share of the general 
government finances covered by the rule." (European Commission 2006, p. 164)  
The fiscal rule index contains all the available information on national numerical fiscal 
rules. According to DG ECFIN (2007) "the characteristics of fiscal rules vary 
depending on the sub-sector to which they apply. Fiscal rules applying to higher 
levels of government are usually incorporated into a multi-annual budgetary 
framework whereas most rules applied to regional and local governments rely 
preponderantly on annual schemes." (p. 76) 
 
Data analysis and Results  
The fiscal rules database on domestic fiscal rules in force for EU Member States 
contains the time series from 1990 to 2013. The dataset covers all types of numerical 
fiscal rules (budget balance, debt, expenditure, and revenue rules) at all levels of 
government (central, regional, and local, general government, and social security). 
For the purpose of this paper, we analyse the data from 2008-2013 according to the 
type of the numerical fiscal rule (see Table 1) and the trend for fiscal rule index in the 
period 2003-2013. (Appendix 1)   
 
Table 1 
Fiscal rule strength index according to the type of the numerical fiscal rule, 2008 -
2013 
Country Type1 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria BBR 6.92 6.92 6.92 7.5 8.81 8.81 
ER - 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 
Belgium BBR 6.02 6.02 6.02 6.02 6.68 6.68 
ER 7.57 7.57 7.57 7.57 7.57 7.57 
Bulgaria DR 7.74 7.74 7.74 7.74 7.74 7.74 
ER 4.72 4.72 4.72 4.72 5.72 5.72 
BBR - - - 5.24 7.06 7.06 
Croatia ER - - - 7.47 7.47 7.47 
Cyprus BBR - - - - - 6.52 
Czech Republic ER 5.74 5.74 5.74 5.74 5.74 5.74 
DR 6.6 6.12 6.12 6.12 6.12 6.12 
Denmark BBR 5.88 5.88 5.88 5.88 5.88 5.88 
ER 5.88 5.88 5.88 5.88 - - 
RR 7.63 7.63 7.63 - - - 
Estonia BBR 6.95 6.95 6.95 6.95 6.3 6.3 
DR 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67 5.05 6.67 
Finland BBR 6.77 6.77 6.77 6.77 6.11 6.11 
DR - - - 6.11 6.11 6.11 
ER 6.27 6.27 6.27 6.27 4.95 4.95 
RR 3.98 3.98 3.98 3.98 3.98 3.98 
France BBR 7.73 7.73 7.73 7.73 7.73 7.73 
                                               










Country Type1 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
DR 7.62 7.62 7.62 7.62 7.62 7.62 
ER 4.71 4.71 7.33 7.33 7.33 7.33 
RR 6.27 7.62 7.62 7.62 7.62 7.62 
Germany BBR 6.59 6.59 6.59 10 10 10 
ER 5.87 5.87 5.87 - - - 
Greece BBR - - - - 7.91 7.91 
Hungary BBR 5.05 - - - - - 
DR - 5.05 5.05 5.05 5.05 5.05 
Ireland BBR 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 
DR - - - - - 8.23 
ER 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 
Italy BBR 6.78 6.78 6.78 6.78 6.78 6.78 
ER 6.14 6.14 6.14 6.14 6.8 7.2 
Latvia BBR - - - - - 7.21 
DR 6.07 6.07 6.07 6.07 6.07 6.07 
RR 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67 
Lithuania BBR 6.81 6.81 6.81 6.81 6.81 6.81 
DR 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 8.02 8.02 
ER 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 6.98 6.98 
RR 7.62 7.62 7.62 7.62 6.3 6.3 
Luxembourg BBR 6.41 6.41 6.41 6.41 6.41 6.41 
DR 3.98 3.98 3.98 3.98 3.98 3.98 
ER 4.66 4.66 3.3 3.3 3.98 3.98 
Malta - - - - - - - 
Netherlands ER 5.64 5.64 5.64 5.64 6.3 6.3 
RR 6.01 6.01 6.01 6.01 6.01 6.01 
Poland BBR - - - 7.24 6.58 6.58 
DR 9.05 9.05 9.05 9.05 9.05 9.05 
ER - - - 6.81 7.47 7.47 
Portugal BBR 4.78 4.78 4.78 4.78 5.74 5.74 
DR - - - - - 7.07 
Romania BBR 5.05 5.05 5.05 5.05 5.05 5.05 
DR 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 
Slovakia BBR 5.44 6.64 6.64 6.64 6.64 6.64 
DR 6.01 6.01 6.01 6.01 6.01 6.01 
ER 8.04 8.04 8.04 8.04 7.38 7.38 
Slovenia DR 7.62 7.62 7.62 7.62 6.96 6.96 
ER - - 5.51 5.51 - - 
Spain BBR 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66 8.77 8.77 
DR 5.74 5.74 5.74 5.74 5.74 5.74 
ER - - - 5.72 6.92 6.92 










Country Type1 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
ER 6.84 6.84 8.02 8.02 8.02 8.02 
United Kingdom BBR - 7.36 7.62 7.62 7.62 7.62 
DR 8.14 - 8.02 7.62 7.62 7.62 




 Data in Table 1 show that all EU Member States, including Croatia, have some 
type of numerical fiscal rule. Almost all EU Member States (except Croatia, 
Netherlands and Slovenia) have budget balance rules. Countries that apply all types 
of numerical fiscal rules are Finland, France and Lithuania. 
 The design of the appropriate fiscal framework by countries depends on country-
specific circumstances as evidenced by the rules introduced in the periods 2005-
2008 and 2009-2012 by country or that will enter into force after 31December  2013. 
Countries whose main target/constraint is structural balance as % of GDP are Austria, 
Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Latvia, Portugal and Slovakia. Targets 
of all of these countries are in general government. An interesting situation can be 
found in Croatia where targets are debt ceiling in terms of debt/GDP ratio in central 
government and social security and nominal expenditure in % of GDP in general 
government. Based on the fiscal rule strength index for each rule, a comprehensive 
time-varying composite fiscal rule index2 for each Member State was constructed by 
summing up all fiscal rule strength indices in force in respective EU Member States, 
including Croatia (Appendix 1). From the data in Appendix 1, we can observe that in 
the period 2003-2013, countries with a positive growth of FRI are Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Denmark, Spain, Croatia, Hungary, Luxembourg, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Slovakia and the United Kingdom. Countries with a 
negative growth of FRI are Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Romania 
and Slovenia. The FRI for Croatia, from the period 2003-2013, is continually on the rise 
from -1.01 in 2008 to a high 1.43 in 2013. This proves that Croatia is continuously and 
systematically improving its budget balance in the current economic situation. 
 
Conclusion  
Fiscal policy rules control targets for annual government deficits, debts or spending. 
The objective of fiscal rules is to enhance budgetary discipline and to foster policy 
coordination between different levels of government, depending on their 
institutional coverage. A European fiscal framework was established with the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. 
 Our analysis of FRSI and FRI has shown that all EU Member States, including 
Croatia, have some type of numerical fiscal rule. Countries that apply all types of 
numerical fiscal rules are Finland, France and Lithuania, while all other countries 
(except Croatia, Netherlands and Slovenia) have budget balance rules. In the 
observed period, 2003-2013, most of the analysed EU Member States recorded a 
positive growth of FRI. In 2013, countries with the highest FRI were France and 
                                               
2See more about FRI at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/fiscal_rules/index_
en.htm The FRI is calculated using an index for strength of fiscal rules that gives an equal 











Germany. The FRI for Croatia, in the period 2003-2013, is continually on the rise from -
1.01 in 2008 to a high 1.43 in 2013. That proves that Croatia is continuously and 
systematically improving its budget balance in the current economic situation.  
 To boost economic recovery and maintain fiscal deficit within the 3%, EC is 
introducing a new mechanism of control known as the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedures (The MIP procedure) and is tightening the control of macroeconomic 
imbalance. Our recommendation for future research would be to examine fiscal rule 
effectiveness across government levels in all European Union Member States and 
beyond, considering significant heterogeneity of national fiscal frameworks within 
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Appendix 1  
Fiscal rule index by EU Member States in the period 2003-2013 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
AT 0.2934 0.2934 0.1732 0.1732 0.1732 0.1231 0.7631 0.7631 0.8574 1.0740 1.0740 
BE 0.0511 0.0511 0.0511 0.0511 0.0511 0.0511 0.0511 0.0511 0.0511 0.0855 0.0855 
BG 0.7833 0.7833 0.8033 1.3520 1.3520 1.3520 1.3520 1.3520 1.7774 2.0658 2.0658 
CY -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 0.3838 
CZ -1.0147 -0.4177 0.2125 0.2125 0.2125 0.2125 -0.0505 -0.0505 -0.0505 -0.0505 -0.0505 
DE 0.3975 0.3975 0.3975 0.3975 0.3975 0.3975 1.1160 0.7106 1.1920 1.1920 3.1964 
DK 1.3983 1.3983 1.3983 1.3983 1.5037 1.5037 1.5037 1.5037 0.7196 1.5301 1.5301 
EE 0.9492 0.9492 0.9492 0.9492 0.9492 0.9492 0.9492 1.0816 1.0816 0.7330 1.0816 
EL -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.,0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 0.8707 0.8707 
ES 1.5884 1.5884 1.5884 1.4203 1.4203 1.4203 1.4203 1.4203 2.3747 3.0457 3.0457 
FI 1.0334 1.0334 1.0334 1.0334 1.0358 0.6102 0.1906 0.1906 0.4364 0.3152 0.3152 
FR -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0043 0.4425 0.4425 0.5778 0.9355 0.7218 1.4162 1.4162 3.5396 
HR -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 0.3104 0.3104 1.4270 1.4270 1.4270 
HU -0.7874 -0.7874 -0.7874 -0.7874 0.4158 0.4158 0.1628 0.1628 0.1628 0.9464 0.9464 
IE -0.9892 -0.7668 -0.7668 -0.7668 -0.7668 -0.7668 -0.7668 -0.7668 -0.7668 -0.7756 2.7502 
IT 0.0221 0.0221 0.0221 0.0221 -0.1947 -0.2159 -0.2676 -0.2255 -0.2151 -0.2134 -0.1949 
LT -0.0218 -0.0218 -0.0218 0.0423 0.0423 0.6852 0.6852 0.6852 0.6852 0.7065 0.7065 
LU 0.9167 1.8405 1.8405 1.8405 1.8405 1.8405 1.8405 1.1998 1.1998 1.2093 1.6949 
LV 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126 2.4459 
MT -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 -1.0147 
NL 1.0020 1.0020 1.0020 1.0020 1.0020 1.0020 1.0020 1.0020 1.0020 1.0746 1.0746 
PL 1.0882 1.0882 1.0882 1.9412 1.9412 1.0882 1.5338 1.5338 1.9039 1.8602 1.6823 
PT -0.1517 -0.1517 -0.1517 -0.1517 -0.0967 -0.0967 -0.0967 -0.0967 -0.0967 0.0646 1.7486 
RO -0.5867 -0.5867 -0.5867 -0.5867 -0.5867 -0.5867 -0.5867 -0.5867 -0.5867 -0.5867 -0.5867 
SE 2.0081 2.0081 2.0081 2.0081 2.1271 2.1271 2.1271 2.2847 2.2847 2.2847 2.2847 
SI 0.3590 0.3590 0.3590 0.3590 0.3590 0.3590 0.3590 0.3759 0.4865 -0.8127 -0.8127 
SK 0.2325 0.2325 0.2325 0.2325 0.2325 0.2325 0.2078 0.2078 0.2078 2.4719 2.4719 
UK 1.8600 1.8600 1.8600 1.8600 1.8600 1.8600 -1.0147 1.5178 1.5024 1.5024 1.5024 
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